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The controversy continues. 
Mueller v. Allen: 





by Robert M . Craig 
Religion has always had an importan t place in Ameri· 
ca's history, cult ure. and Institutions. The growth of school· 
ing, one of the nation's most important institutions. has 
been str ongly influenced by sectarian concerns. The. rela· 
tionship between religion and schooli ng, while cont rib ut· 
1ng to our heritage, has also created ex tensive controversy. 
During the last forty years this controversy has given rise to 
much litigation In the federal court system of the United 
States. In 1983 the Supreme Court added fuel to this contro-
versial fire in its decision in Mueller v. Allen. The Supreme 
Courrs rendering In Mueller will be remembered for the 
Courrsapprovat of the legality of a Minnesota statute allow-
ing tax deductions for transportation, textbooks and tui-
tion to parents sending their children to sectarian.schools. 
The Mueller decision represents a new direction in the Su-
preme Court's attitude toward public and private schooling. 
Background 
Religious issues in the public schools center primarily 
on the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses in the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the tree exercise thereof." In this short statement ourre-
ligious guarantees are set forth. It was not until 1947 in Ever· 
son v. Board of Education, however, that the Supreme Court 
held that the Establi shment Clause applied to the states 
through judicial Incorporation of the Establishment Claus~ 
with the Fourteenth Amendment. Seven years prior to the 
Everson decision, the Free Exercise Clause was held to ap-
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ply to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut. As church-state 
litigation grew, the Court sought to systematize and stan· 
dardize a set of ru les upon which to judge such cases. 
In companion cases in 1963(Abbington School District 
v. Shempp and Murray v. Curlett) the Supreme Court made 
an attempt to establish a set of rules or a test with which to 
judge cases involving 're ligion and public schooling. Deliv· 
ering the opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice Clark 
staled that in issues involving First Amendment religious 
guarantees the Court must consider ·'what arc the purpose 
and the primary effect of the enactment? If either Is the ad· 
vancement or the inhibition of religion, then the enactment 
exceeds the scope of the legislative power as ctrcum· 
scribed by the Constitution." In 1970, a third test was added 
lo the purpose and primary effect test . In Walz v. Tax Com· 
mission, the Court's third test was stated as lollows, ·we 
must also be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an 
excessive governmental entanglement with religion." The 
three tests were consolidated and evoked one year later by 
Chief Justice Burger in Lemon v. Kurtzman. Since 1971, the 
three-prong test has been used to judge church-state Is· 
sues before the Court. 
The three-prong test has been criticized since its In· 
ception. Some of the more valid criticisms assert that the 
Lemon test has "not produced coherence" (Manning, 1981), 
"has led to sheer ad-hoc determination of law-judgments" 
(Stevens, 1980) and that "the Court's eflorl s have fai led to 
meet both the practical and theoretical goals o f conslitu · 
tion al adjudication" (Gray, 1981). More specific to lhe co n· 
cerns of this review are Justice Renquist's comments in re· 
gards to the three-pro.1g test: "We can only dimly perceive 
the lines of demarcation in this ordinari ly sensitive area o f 
constitutional law ... while the princip le !the three.prong 
test I 1s welt settled, our cases have also emphasized lhal It 
provides no more than a helpful sign post ... ·• 
While the Mueller decision does not represent a com· 
plete abandonment of the Lemon test, it seriously under· 
mines i ts intent. Indeed, Justice Renqu ist uses the test In 
delivering the majority opinion of the Court in Mueller. It is 
his interpretation of the facts of the case with tho three· 
prong test that leaves one in wonder as to why the test was 
used at al I. The majority opinion of the court may have more 
to do with the prevailing social and political mood of the )us· 
t1ces than with a clearly articulated theoretical foundation 
of the law. 
The Case 
The statute under examination is a Minnesota law al· 
lowing state taxpayers, in computing their state Income 
tax, to deduct expenses incurred in providing textbooks, 
transportation, and tuition for all children attending ele· 
mentary and secondary schools. The main beneficiaries ol 
the tax deduction plan were parents who sent their children 
to religious schools, as 96 percent of those attending pri-
~ate 
schools 
attended sectarian schools. Minnesota's pub· 
he. schools are generally prohibited by law from charging 
tu1t1on. Only 79 students out of 900,000 public school stu· 
dents in Minnesota, during the 1978-79 school year, were eli · 
gible for the tax credits. 
. In spite of the revealing statistical evidence, the major· 
1ty 
opinion 
of the Court reasoned that the Minnesota statute 
had a secular religio us p rpose. "An educated populace," 
said Justice Renquist, "is essential to the politica l and eco· 
nomic health of any community, and a state's efforts to as· 
sist parents in meeting the rising costs of educational ex-
penses plainl y serves this secu lar purpose .... " In 
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delivering the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Ren· 
quist reasoned that by educating a growing number of 
school age children private schools will reduce the taxpay-
ers' burden for financing public schooling. In addition, pri-
vate schools may possibly serve as a "benchmark" for pub-
lic school emulation, Renquist said. It is d iffi cult to see how 
tax deductions to parents of parochial school students, 
which cause funds to flow from a state's treasury, can pro-
vide for the reduction of tax burdens. 
Next the Court took up the question of the primary ef-
fect of the Minnesota statute. Reason ing that the Minne-
sota statute provided for only several of many deductions, 
the Court asserted that it thus helped to equalize the tax 
burden of the citizens of the state. More importantly, said 
Renquist, the deductions were available to all parents of el-
ementary and secondary students in the state, providing as-
sistance to a broad spectrum of Minnesota citizens. The 
dissenters to Renquist's assertions on the primary-effect 
point note that only in the rarest of cases are parents of pub-
li
c school 
s tudents requi red to pay tui t ion for school enro ll-
ment in Minnesota. Also argued is the fact that 95 percent of 
private school students attend some form of sectarian 
school; thus the clear intent of the law is directed towards 
financial re lief to sectarian schools. 
Finally the Court moved on to the thi rd prong of the 
Lemon test. In addressing this point, the Court found no evi-
dence of excessive governmental entanglem ent. The only 
governmental invo lvement found was in regard to quest ions 
as to whether particular textbooks qualify for deduction. 
State officials could reasonably question whether particu-
lar books were or were not secular in nature, disallowing any 
deduction for textbooks used to foster any particular re li-
gion. 
Conclusions 
The Mueller decision has debased the importance of 
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the three-prong test as a controll ing precedent in church · 
state issues. By call ing the test no more than a "helpful 
signpost,"' Justice Renquist was able to construe the facts 
of the case to meet some sort of social o r polit ical agenda. 
Using previous decisions in concert with the Mueller 
decision, it is impossible to bu il d a theoretical base from 
the use of the three-prong test. Wllat we have then is a se· 
ries of decisions based upon the nuances and specifics of 
part icular statutes, judged by a part icular configuration and 
collective disposition o l justices' opinions. 
Tu ition tax credits, educational voucher plans and 
other such alternative financial patterns for parents of pri-
vate school students have been advocated for some time. In 
the face of unparalleled criticism of the public sc hools such 
plans grow even more attractive. Not withstanding the criti-
c ism of such plans-o nes which center around the possi-
bility of fraud, racial discrimination, cost, economic 
segregation - the impact on the public schools and the 
church-state issue, the Court ruled in favor of the Minnesota 
plan. The obstacles to a tuit ion tax deduction plan were 
overcome by the Court in what can be considered a poli tica l 
and social statement as to the perceived current condition 
of compulsory public schooling rather than by the logic of 
jud ic ial inquiry. 
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